Investigators probing the November 10 car bombing that killed 13 people have uncovered the meticulous recruitment playbook used by Jaish-e-Mohammed handler Maulvi Irfan Ahmed to build a sophisticated “white-collar terror module” of highly educated professionals in Haryana and beyond. Irfan, arrested from Jammu and Kashmir, employed three calculated strategies to identify, befriend, and radicalise potential recruits—doctors, engineers, and students—who later formed the invisible network responsible for the Delhi blast and a larger planned serial-attack conspiracy.

The first method was building personal rapport through seemingly innocuous conversations. Irfan would engage targets in everyday settings such as hospitals or neighbourhoods, steering discussions toward religion and gauging receptiveness to extremist interpretations of Islam. Once a positive response emerged, he deepened the relationship. This is exactly how he recruited Dr Muzammil Shakeel: what began as casual interaction at a hospital evolved into a terror partnership, with the physician eventually procuring explosives, weapons, and funding.

The second tactic involved meticulous social-media surveillance. Irfan scoured profiles for posts reflecting separatist sentiments, anti-India rhetoric, or religious fervour. When he identified a match—such as Kashmiri student Adeel Ahmad Rather—he flooded the target with curated propaganda and religious content. Adeel’s eventual arrest in Jammu and Kashmir cracked the entire module open, exposing the network’s scale and sophistication.

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The third approach was mosque-based scouting. Irfan monitored regular worshippers, particularly those displaying intense piety, and initiated contact after prayers. One such recruit was Jasir Bilal Wani (alias Danish), recommended by Adeel Rather and subsequently drawn into the fold through sustained ideological grooming.

Digital evidence reveals Irfan reported directly to JeM handler “Hanzulla” in Pakistan and received two AK-series rifles via an infiltrated terrorist. After a fallout in August 2023 when Irfan demanded his handler’s real identity, all communication shifted to encrypted Telegram channels. Each module member had clearly defined roles—procurement, bomb-making, logistics, and funding—yet shared the common objective of executing high-impact strikes across Indian cities.

With most suspects now in custody, security agencies warn that Irfan’s recruitment model represents a dangerous new template: patient, low-profile radicalisation of educated urban professionals capable of operating undetected for years.

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