From Hijackings To Shoe Bombs, Aviation Security Evolved Through Decades Of Deadly Attacks

The attempted attack on a flydubai flight bound for Tel Aviv has once again brought the security of aircraft cockpits and the screening of airline pilots under scrutiny, reviving questions that have shaped commercial aviation safety since the September 11, 2001 attacks. On September 30, 2026, the co-pilot of flydubai Flight FZ1073 allegedly attacked the captain inside the cockpit with an emergency crash axe, prompting a dramatic loss of control. The aircraft plunged by more than 16,000 feet within minutes before the situation was brought under control. Passengers and other pilots travelling on board helped subdue the attacker, while the injured captain played a crucial role in stabilising the aircraft. The plane eventually landed safely in Saudi Arabia, with everyone on board surviving. UAE prosecutors have described the incident as an attempted terrorist attack, while investigators continue to examine the co-pilot’s background, motives and recruitment history.

The flydubai incident has highlighted a difficult aspect of modern aviation security: measures designed to keep attackers out of the cockpit can also limit access when the threat comes from inside it. The most fundamental changes followed the September 11 attacks, when four US passenger aircraft were hijacked and nearly 3,000 people were killed. In the aftermath, aviation authorities strengthened passenger screening, expanded air marshal programmes and required airlines to install reinforced cockpit doors capable of resisting forced entry. In the United States, the new security framework also led to the creation of the Transportation Security Administration. International aviation rules subsequently incorporated stronger cockpit-door requirements, making the flight deck a much more tightly protected area than it had been before 9/11.

Another major shift came after the attempted December 2001 shoe-bombing by British militant Richard Reid, who tried to detonate explosives hidden in his footwear while travelling on an aircraft from Paris to Miami. Although the attempt failed, it demonstrated that screening procedures had to account for concealed explosives that could evade conventional checks. The incident resulted in passengers being required to remove shoes for separate screening at US airports, a practice that became one of the most recognisable features of post-9/11 airport security. Aviation security subsequently evolved further in response to other attempted attacks and plots, with authorities expanding explosive detection, baggage screening and passenger-screening technologies. The broader lesson from these incidents was that aviation security could not rely on a single layer of protection and instead needed multiple measures covering passengers, baggage, aircraft access and airport operations. 

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The security equation became more complicated with incidents involving the people already authorised to enter the cockpit. In 2013, a Mozambique Airlines captain locked his co-pilot out of the cockpit and deliberately crashed the aircraft, prompting renewed discussion about safeguards against a single pilot gaining complete control. The issue became even more prominent after Germanwings Flight 9525 crashed in the French Alps in March 2015, killing all 150 people aboard. Investigators concluded that co-pilot Andreas Lubitz deliberately locked the captain out of the cockpit and flew the Airbus A320 into the mountains. Following the crash, European aviation authorities issued recommendations concerning the presence of two authorised people in the cockpit and reassessed procedures for pilot medical and psychological fitness. The incident demonstrated that reinforced cockpit doors could prevent an external hijacker from gaining access while simultaneously creating a different vulnerability if a pilot inside the cockpit deliberately misused that protection. 

The latest flydubai episode brings that tension into focus once again. Unlike the threats that prompted reinforced cockpit doors after 9/11, the alleged attacker was a member of the flight crew who already had legitimate access to the flight deck. Reports said passengers and off-duty pilots helped intervene after the captain was attacked, while the aircraft’s rapid descent triggered an emergency response. Israeli authorities have also been examining the circumstances surrounding the incident and the co-pilot’s background. The case is likely to renew scrutiny of how airlines assess pilots before recruitment, how information about security or aviation-related concerns is shared between countries, and how crews can respond when an authorised cockpit occupant becomes the source of a threat. Aviation security rules have repeatedly evolved after major incidents, but the history since 2001 shows that each new safeguard can create new operational questions. The flydubai attack is therefore the latest episode in a continuing effort to balance cockpit protection, crew access, pilot screening and the ability to respond rapidly when a threat emerges from within the aircraft itself. 

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